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Zusammenfassung
Während Massenmedien üblicherweise integratives Potenzial zugeschrieben wird, wird dem Internet eher eine
schädliche Wirkung auf den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt unterstellt. Entsprechende Metaphern zu
„Filterblasen“ und „Echokammern“ haben inzwischen auch in den öffentlichen Diskurs Einzug gehalten.
Studien, die entsprechende Wirkungen einer digitalen Fragmentierung nachweisen, sind allerdings bisher eher
selten. Der empirische Forschungsstand stützt Befürchtungen zu einem deutlichen Verlust an
gesellschaftlichem Zusammenhalt durch das Internet somit nicht. Allerdings gibt es bei Extremgruppen am
politischen Rand Anzeichen für digitale Fragmentierung. Angesichts des heterogenen Forschungsstands
systematisiert der Beitrag theoretische Annahmen und empirische Befunde und argumentiert, dass die
Erfassung digitaler Fragmentierung und ihrer Wirkungen weiter notwendig ist.
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Summary
While mass media are generally ascribed integrative potential, scholars assume negative effects on social
cohesion for the Internet. Respective metaphors such as “filter bubbles” and “echo chambers” have meanwhile
found their way into public discourse. However, empirical research that documents detrimental effects of
digital fragmentation remains the exception. The state of research thus does not support fears about a stark
loss of social cohesion due to the Internet. Yet there are groups on the fringe of the political spectrum that
appear to be digitally fragmented. Given these heterogeneous results, the article systematizes theoretical
assumptions and empirical findings and argues that it remains necessary to assess the extent and effects of
digital fragmentation.
Keywords: integration, fragmentation, polarization, filter bubble, echo chamber
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Introduction
Why do we keep discussing filter bubbles, echo
chambers, and similar concepts? Kelly Garrett,
associate professor at the Ohio State University, asked
this question in reaction to a sessionon on digital
fragmentation at the 2017 meeting of the International
Communication Association. As other already existing
research, the presentations, including my own, had
shown little evidence of digital fragmentation,
prompting Garrett’s somewhat provocative question.
Two years later, filter bubbles and echo chambers are
still present in public discourse as well as academic
literature. Some conclude that we should abandon
these terms, because they are ill-defined in the first
place and hardly supported by empirical results
(Bruns, 2019). Others underline their earlier warnings
of online echo chambers (Sunstein, 2018). We are
apparently not through with the discussion yet, and I
want to argue that this is for just cause. In this review,
I will address the thin evidence for digital
fragmentation effects, but highlight their relevance
even if digital fragmentation appears not to be a
dominant pattern affecting all parts of a given society.
The present article is therefore not only an (albeit
belated) answer to Garrett’s question, but additionally
attempts to systematize the types of research
undertaken on digital fragmentation. This should not
only explain the so-far meager evidence of
fragmentation effects, but also outline avenues for
future research.
Integrative media effects and digital fragmentation
Before I come to echo chambers and filter bubbles
specifically, a brief overview of why and how these
concepts are investigated is important. Digital
fragmentation, under whatever catchy name, is
discussed with regard to the role that media play for
the integration of individuals and societies. McQuail
(2005) summarizes that traditional mass media have
long been considered as ambivalent forces in
increasing or de-creasing social cohesion: Media can
bring large audiences together and create or support
solidarity, but such a “centripetal effect” (p. 90) can
also lead to uniformity and social control if it is
overdone. One the other hand, diversification of media
can have “centrifugal effects” whose positive
outcomes can be liberation and mobility (p. 90). A
more pessimistic view of such effects focuses instead
on individual isolation in a fragmented society and the
loss of norms.
Accordingly, research into integrative and
disintegrative media effects has a long and
multifaceted tradition. And changes in the media
system have brought about discussions and research on
a loss of (positive) integrative effects before the
current debate about digital media. Potential negative
effects of audience fragmentation were reviewed in
depth in many countries following the introduction of
multichannel television in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g.,
Hasebrink, 1997; E. Katz, 1996; W. A. Katz, 1982;
Youn, 1994). This discussion, however, pales in
comparison to the one that began shortly afterwards
and was concerned with digital media and the Internet.
Webster (2014) lists a number of metaphors that
different authors have coined to describe a potential
digital fragmentation, starting in the second half of the
1990s: “gated communities, sphericules, silos, echo
chambers, cyber-Balkans, red media–blue media, or
filter bubbles” (p. 19; original emphasis). The
respective writers see different reasons for a loss of
integration due to the Internet, digital media, and their
use (a more extensive discussion is provided in Mahrt,
2019). In short, these have to do with a) the much
larger offering of online content compared to
traditional media. This b) allows users to be much
more selective when choosing media or specific
content. They could therefore use more or exclusively
content that is in line with their interests or worldviews
and might avoid other topics or opinions. In the same
vein, they may prefer to connect online with people
who share their interests and opinions, a tendency
called homophily (Goel, Mason, & Watts, 2010).
Combined, the quasi infinite amount of online content
options as well as people’s tendency to prefer like-
minded messages and people lead to the creation of
echo chambers (Sunstein, 2018). Such behavior could
c) be reinforced by the technical structures of digital
platforms, whose algorithms are often programmed to
offer users similar content to what they have
previously used. So if a platform learns, through
cookies or because a user signed in, that this person
has a preference for one type of content, matching
offerings may be displayed more prominently as
suggestions for further use. This forms the basis of the
filter bubble hypothesis (Pariser, 2011).
Digital fragmentation may therefore take different
shapes and be driven by a combination of factors.
There is no consensus about what the term means or at
what point a significant, let alone socially detrimental
level of fragmentation is reached. Fragmentation can
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refer to the proliferation of content, a more selective
and homophilic usage behavior, as well as
customization through algorithms. The focus in this
article, however, will be on effects that fragmented
media use through these different avenues may have
on individuals or societies.
All of the metaphorical terms for digital fragmentation
hold strong reservations about the effects of the
increase in content options, the potential for
selectivity, and the curation of content through
customizing algorithms. Positive integrative media
functions, for example sharing an agenda of the most
relevant issues a society faces (a well-established
centripetal media effect; McCombs & Reynolds,
2009), could be diminished if traditional outlets are
increasingly replaced by digital offerings. That the
amount of available content has risen and accessing
different types of content has become easier with the
Internet is undeniable. Likewise, the popularity of
online content is clearly unevenly distributed, with
only few items being used by a large audience and
popularity quickly dropping. Online audiences are thus
spread out across a very large number of outlets
(Anderson, 2006; Webster, 2014). Yet these
developments in online offerings and use have not led
to clear-cut findings about harmful effects for the
integration of societies, as Garrett pointed out with his
question. There are, however, different reasons for
this, as research into actual fragmentizing effects of
digital media show.
Research on the integrative effect of digital media
Studies into the effect of a larger digital media
offering, more selective online media use, and
algorithmic customization examine different aspects of
the issue and employ different methods. This partly
explains the heterogeneous state of the field and some
of the rather small effects that scholars have found. In
the following, I will discuss the pertinent research on
actual effects of digital fragmentation grouped by the
dimensions they consider, as either dependent or
independent variables.
Conversations
As mentioned above, that people talk about topics
from the media can have integrative effects through
agenda setting. But also more generally, conversations
with other people about media or their content are a
social activity, which is assumed to help bring people
together (Friedland, 2001; Vlasic, 2004). Interpersonal
communication has thus been used as an indicator of
integrative media effects before, yet with mixed
results. When more television channels become
available, for example, this does not strongly affect the
frequency of TV-related conversations (Handel, 2000),
and viewers’ perception of the medium as helpful for
interpersonal communication may even increase
(Holtz-Bacha & Peiser, 1999).
It is therefore hardly surprising that studies on the
effect of the Internet through conversations as a
dependent variable do not find strong effects either.
Comparing different points in times when Internet
penetration was low, intermediate, and high,
respectively, does not reveal large differences in the
frequency with which people talk about media
(Gehrau, 2019; Gehrau & Goertz, 2010). Even when
many people use the Internet throughout the day via
smartphones, they still regularly engage with others in
conversations, despite the diversity of accessible
online content and possibilities for individual
selection.
Other studies have looked at outcomes of
conversations rather than their mere occurrence. The
number of issues people find important as well as the
level of overlap between these agendas have been
considered. But again, there are only slight differences
over time while the digital media offering grew larger
and increasingly complemented or even replaced other
forms of media use. Slightly more topics are named by
respondents as important issues (Gehrau, 2013; Haas
& Brosius, 2013; Lee, 2009), but there is still a high
level of overlap between individual agendas (Gehrau,
2013, 2019).
The limited results when looking for digital
fragmentation effects via conversations and agendas
may have different reasons (Mahrt, 2019). A central
limitation of most studies is that they consider the
relationship between digital media and the respective
dependent variables very roughly. They investigate the
number of issues respondents name on the aggregate
level and relate it, e.g., to the penetration rate of the
Internet or smartphones at different points in time.
However, the penetration rate of the Internet in a
society in general may be only slightly related to the
number of conversations people have with others or
the kinds of issues they see as important. Individual
differences in digital media use or received content are
not taken into account in the cited studies, which look
at aggregated phenomena across time instead.
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Use of social network sites (SNS), its antecedents, and
effects
A second important field of research investigates
potential fragmentizing effects within social network
sites. These are highly popular among Internet users in
many countries, help to distribute content from a vast
array of sources, and can be potentially customized in
two ways: SNS users typically follow, subscribe to, or
otherwise connect with other accounts so that their
own timeline or newsfeed within the platform is
individually curated in accordance with their choices.
In addition, platforms select and rank which postings
from others to display to each user and in which order.
How SNS use affects, for example, the agenda-setting
function of media is therefore analyzed in a number of
studies.
Two such studies (Mahrt, 2019; Wells & Thorson,
2017) use knowledge about current political events as
an indicator of potentially integrative or fragmentizing
effects, while SNS use serves as an independent
variable. However, the knowledge about current events
among Facebook users is not affected by how many
news-related posts appear in someone’s timeline, how
many contacts (“friends”) they have on Facebook, or
whether or not they customize their timeline to fit
personal preferences. Instead, the by-far largest effects
on knowledge about current affairs comes back to
gender (men enjoying higher knowledge) and a high
interest in news (Wells & Thorson, 2017). Similarly, a
study on how many recent news items media users
recognize reveals political interest as well as general
media use, especially that of printed newspapers, as
important predictors (Mahrt, 2019). These studies thus
confirm that long-standing findings on news use still
hold true in the online era, but do not show relevant
effects of SNS use—at least not while people continue
to use many other media as well.
Other studies focus less on individual characteristics
and general media use of SNS users, but investigate
the effects of a more or less homophilic network of
contacts on such platforms. The users’ choices about
whom to “friend” on Facebook determine to a
considerable degree what they see in their newsfeed
(Bakshy, Messing, & Adamic, 2015), and scholars
have analyzed whether SNS tend to diversify or limit
with what news users come into contact and what
consequences this yields. Baek, Jeong, and Rhee
(2015) find a fragmentizing effect of SNS use: The
relatively homogenous contact networks within SNS
increase users’ skepticism against election polls that
do not match their own opinion. This could be an
illustration of the echo chamber metaphor:
predominantly seeing an echo of one’s own opinion
online, due to being surrounded by like-minded
contacts that insulate against opinion-challenging
information.
On the other hand, Kim and colleagues (Kim, 2011;
Kim, Hsu, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2013; Lee, Choi, Kim, &
Kim, 2014) find that contact networks on SNS tend to
be heterogeneous, which increases the diversity of
perceived issues. SNS use could therefore result in less
fragmentation, because it should create more overlap
between the content that different users view. Their
agenda could thus be broadened beyond their personal
interests (see also Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018).
In sum, the role of SNS in digital fragmentation
appears to be complex, and many factors regarding
users’ characteristics, preferences, and usage behavior
need to be taken into account to properly assess their
effect. A study on Facebook by Stark, Magin, and
Jürgens (2017) takes on exactly this endeavor. It
considers, among others, characteristics of users (e.g.,
political interest and personality traits), news media
use including, but also beyond SNS, and the size and
structure of contact networks on Facebook. The
scholars investigate how issue and opinion perception,
but also the propensity to express one’s own opinion
are affected by individual traits, media use, and SNS-
related behavior. The results turn out very nuanced:
Some aspects of Facebook use are related to some of
the dependent variables. Use of Facebook overall, for
instance, does not make a difference for the number of
current issues people find important (p. 136).
However, using Facebook specifically for information
(alongside other news sources) increases users’
perception of being well-informed. At the same time,
this perception is strongly affected by political interest,
personality traits (such as duty to keep informed and
personality strength), age, and gender as well (p. 143).
The authors stress that simply looking at frequency of
Facebook use overestimates the platform’s impact on
issue perception and other potential outcomes and that
many other factors need to be considered in
conjunction with SNS usage. These results also
confirm long-standing findings about the importance
of political interest and general orientation towards
information for news use. SNS can be employed to
access news as well, of course, if the users choose to
do so. The study thus serves as a reminder that SNS
are, in a sense, just an information source like others.
It also shows that? SNS use is connected in complex
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ways to users’ characteristics as well as their everyday
information routines overall. This limits the possibility
of discovering strong fragmentizing effects through
studying Facebook use alone.
Polarization, a special case of fragmentation
In the US-American context, fragmentation between
the two major political camps, Republicans and
Democrats, is of special interest to research. This is
not exclusive to digital media and their use, as “red
media” (Republican-leaning) and “blue media”
(Democrat-leaning) exist in other sectors of the media
system as well (Hollander, 2008; Iyengar & Hahn,
2009). This type of fragmentation is often discussed
under the term polarization, and scholars investigate
how the Internet affects cleavages between partisan
groups. (The current review focuses on the discussion
of polarization due to digital media in the field of
media and communication. The concept is used in
different ways in other disciplines as well. For this
broader discussion, see Bramson et al., 2017, as well
as Rau and Stier, 2019.)
Tewksbury and Riles (2015) find that high Internet use
slightly increases differences in opinions between
people leaning toward one of the two major parties.
The authors stress, however, that the effect is only
slight and that many other factors influence people’s
attitudes in a much more clear-cut way. This appears
to be in line with results from research summarized in
the previous section that revealed the relatively small
contribution of SNS use to fragmentizing effects.
Other studies investigating polarization take into
account the role of algorithmic customization, and thus
the idea of filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011). Guess (2018)
investigates news items people used digitally, which
could potentially be fragmentized by their interests as
well as algorithms that propose individually tailored
selections of available content. He finds that the media
choices of partisans of both parties as well as those of
independents largely overlap. Only few users with
strong party identification show a clear-cut preference
for ideologically slanted news.
Similar findings are observed in an analysis of which
media and political accounts Twitter users subscribe to
(“follow”) as a function of their own political
orientation (Eady, Nagler, Guess, Zilinsky, & Tucker,
2019). Overlap is again the predominant pattern, with
many Twitter users, especially conservatives, even
following a considerable number of media that oppose
their own political orientation.
What follows from such opinion-challenging digital
media use, however, is not investigated in this broad
analysis of Twitter users. Experimental research shows
that repeatedly exposing people to attitude-inconsistent
tweets may lead to reactance, as Republican-leaning
participants hold more conservative views over time
(Bail et al., 2018). Simply observing the amount of
cross-cutting media exposure is therefore not an
appropriate test of fragmentation effects.
Discussion and avenues for future research
The brief overview presented above shows that the
literature on digital fragmentation has many strands.
Different methodological approaches are adopted, with
differing and sometimes contradictory results, and
even definitions of fragmentation (or polarization) may
diverge. A number of scholars have therefore
concluded that fears about digital fragmentation are
exaggerated or, at least currently, unwarranted (e.g.,
Bruns, 2019; Garrett, 2017; Guess, 2018; Riles, Pilny,
& Tewksbury, 2018; Webster & Ksiazek, 2012).
People still talk to one another, many use SNS in a
way that brings them into contact with a wider, rather
than narrower range of content and people, and
political partisanship does mostly not lead to highly
fragmented use of digital media. Additionally, studies
show that political interest is still a major factor in
explaining how much people learn about current
issues. Not only those with high interest still use other
news sources, such as newspapers or television, and do
not solely rely on SNS for information about current
events.
A simple metaphor such as “filter bubble” or “echo
chamber” can hardly capture all of these different
aspects. As Webster (2014, p. 2) states, “most writers
want to tell a memorable story,” and a catchy name for
a concept (and matching book title) may help to
achieve this goal. The discussion about digital
fragmentation would benefit greatly from a calmer and
more serene examination of the actual evidence and
the different mechanisms of fragmentation potentially
at work.
If one wants to investigate fragmentation as a social
phenomenon, this should not be limited to just digital
media use, let alone one digital platform. It also seems
advisable to consider the characteristics of users in
more detail, especially their interest in politics and
overall media use about current affairs. This makes the
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study much more complex, and given the limited
effects of digital media or SNS use in analyses that
consider at least a few of these variables (e.g., Mahrt,
2019; Stark et al., 2017), it does not seem to be a way
to find clear-cut evidence for the existence of
fragmentation effects.
There is, however, one area in fragmentation research
that deserves more attention. A few studies show that
people at the fringe of the political spectrum may
indeed have a preference for opinion-affirming online
content and avoid cross-cutting exposure (Eady et al.,
2019; Guess, 2018). These hyperpartisan groups are
small—but radical groups may still be important,
especially if they find like-minded individuals beyond
a mere handful. They may, for example, actively
choose to only see what confirms their worldviews,
not shy away from using and sharing half-truths, and
become more entrenched in their convictions over
time. For such groups or their individual members,
digital media offer much better opportunities for these
types of behaviors than traditional media
environments. Thus, digital fragmentation may not be
a dominant phenomenon that describes the entire
population’s media use (Bruns, 2019). Instead, groups
on the margins may decide more or less consciously to
uncouple from the mainstream of society.
Understanding such behavior and the role of content
(providers), individual motivations, group behavior, as
well as incentives from platforms to use more
likeminded or even more radical content appears to be
of high importance to more fully grasp digital
fragmentation.
Obviously, this goes far beyond the study of simply
“liked” pages on Facebook or follower networks on
Twitter, for example. The fragmentation (or
polarization) of such groups is a social, rather than
simply a digital or communicative phenomenon and
therefore needs to be studied as such (Bruns, 2019).
The contribution of communication research should be
to consider media content, media use, and media
effects as embedded in wider social contexts. We may
not find much evidence of filter bubbles or echo
chambers overall, but I hope that the current analysis
of the state of research illustrates why it remains
necessary to continue investigating the extent and the
effects of digital fragmentation.
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